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This article analyzes integrative dynamics within civil society by
looking at civic networks—the web of collaborative ties between
participatory associations acting on behalf of public and collective
interests. Drawing upon evidence from Glasgow and Bristol, the
authors identify a polycentric model of civic coordination based on
horizontal solidarity, in which associations form dense clusters of
strong identity ties (“social bonds”) bridged by fewer instrumental
ties (“transactions”). Basic relational mechanisms, consistent across
localities, provide the basis for both micro- and macrointegration:
they generate networks tight enough to embed civic associations in
a distinctive environment, but open enough to connect them to a
broader range of civic organizations. While contributing primarily
to the understanding of political networks, the authors’ findings also
have implications for current debates on associational social capital
and the impact of political contexts on the structure of collective
action.
INTRODUCTION
In democratic regimes, associations not only represent specific interests,
but also reach out, integrate, and mediate among diverse, sometimes al-
1 This article originates from an investigation of networks of civic organizations in
Britain that Mario Diani conducted with Isobel Lindsay (University of Strathclyde in
Glasgow) and Derrick Purdue (University of West of England, Bristol) from 2000 to
2003. The project was part of the Democracy and Participation Program, funded by
the Economic and Social Research Council (contract L215 25 2006) and directed by
Paul Whiteley. Earlier versions of this argument were presented at the Sunbelt Social
Networks Conference in Portorose, Slovenia, April 2004; the annual meeting of the
American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 2004; the European Science
Foundation seminar “The Collection and Analysis of Network Data,” Ljubljana, July
2005; the Equalsoc Summer School, Trento, September 2006; and at seminars at the
University of California—Los Angeles, Harvard University, the University of Chicago,
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ternative interests or ideological standpoints. The extent to which they
are capable of spanning across social cleavages and different social spheres
is crucial in order to assess the potential of civil society to operate as a
public arena for discussion, mediation, and deliberation (Kornhauser 1959;
Dahl 1961; Linz 1967; Allen 1984; Warren 2001; Edwards, Foley, and
Diani 2001; Fung 2003).
Accordingly, the relationship between associational life and social in-
tegration is affected by the way in which associations relate to each other
and by the structure of interorganizational relations they generate. But
if this is the case, then exploring the contribution of individuals and
associations to democratic life by focusing on individual participation
(Paxton 1999; Putnam 2000) or on the traits of specific organizations
(Minkoff 1997; Powell and Clemens 1998; Skocpol 2003; Warren 2001)
may not be sufficient. One also needs to look at the properties of the
networks that connect organizations to each other and thus facilitate or
constrain their cross-cutting and bridging functions, as well as their overall
contribution to social integration.
In this article we take a few steps in the latter direction by looking at
the structure of civic networks in two British cities, Glasgow and Bristol.
We define “civic networks” as the web of collaborative ties and overlap-
ping memberships between participatory organizations, formally inde-
pendent of the state, acting on behalf of collective and public interests.
While many have evoked the networked structure of civil society (Cohen
and Arato 1992; Diamond 1994; Edwards et al. 2001), few have so far
subjected it to systematic analysis, either analytically or empirically. Here,
we try to do both: we first discuss some key dimensions along which to
analyze civic networks and then look at empirical evidence to prove the
efficacy of this analytical framework as well as to set the parameters for
further research.
Given the initial stage of this research agenda, the process of theori-
zation, the development of analytical tools, and the empirical analysis are
closely intertwined. This means that we do not present a classical hy-
pothesis-testing analysis, but we simultaneously explore and describe the
main features of civic networks, while testing some working hypotheses
along the way. Moreover, we do not regard our cases as particularly
relevant or worthy of attention in their own right, nor do we intend to
generalize our findings. Rather, we use them to test analytical principles
and Stanford Graduate School of Business, fall 2006. We are grateful for valuable
comments and suggestions from Peter Bearman, Ron Breiger, Yannick Lemel, John
Padgett, Charles Tilly, Duncan Watts, Harrison White, and the AJS reviewers. Direct
correspondence to Delia Baldassarri, Department of Sociology, Princeton University,
147 Wallace Hall, Princeton, New Jersey 08544. E-mail: dbalda@princeton.edu
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which might—and in fact do—prove useful to our understanding of civil
society processes at large.
In the first part of the article we lay out our main questions. We first
ask What is the shape of civic networks in democratic society? The con-
nections between different sectors of civil society may take a hierarchical,
centralized form or take a more horizontal, polycentric form. In order to
capture those differences, we focus first on the formal properties of civic
networks. We differentiate at the macrolevel, between hierarchical and
polycentric structures, and at the microlevel, between asymmetric or bal-
anced organizational interdependence. The forms of civic networks pro-
vide insights into the level of potential mobilization, network robustness,
and the nature of organizational interdependence.
Second, we look at the content of network ties. What types of ties may
contribute to the strengthening and integration of civil society, and how?
Most structural analyses of civil society, policy networks, or social move-
ment sectors have either focused on interorganizational alliances (Lau-
mann and Knoke 1987; Rochon and Meyer 1997; Knoke 2001; Ansell
2003) or on the ties created by multiple memberships (Carroll and Ratner
1996; Cornwell and Harrison 2004). But how do they combine? Does the
distribution of those ties follow any discernible pattern? Or do they simply
distribute randomly across civic networks? What do those patterns tell
us about the nature of civil society? We address these questions by dif-
ferentiating between two types of relationships that we call transactions
and social bonds (Le´mieux 1998). The former consist of alliance ties,
involving exclusively the exchange of information and resources necessary
to the pursuit of shared collective goals. The latter add to the former
deeper, underlying links, as the pooling of resources is matched by shared
core members. We suggest that organizations are involved in multiplex
relational patterns in which identity relations—social bonds—embed as-
sociations into dense clusters of interaction, while instrumental relations—
transactions—operate across clusters, integrating them into the broader
civic network.
After introducing our core questions, we outline our research design
and data collection strategy as well as the socioeconomic and political
profile of the two cities, focusing on the different class and ethnic com-
position of the two cities, the varying levels of affluence and education,
and the relative influence of the Labour Party vis-a`-vis other political
traditions.
We then present our empirical findings. First, we describe the formal
properties of civic networks and adjudicate between the alternative hy-
potheses of a hierarchical versus a polycentric structure. Formal properties
are investigated both at the macrolevel, by referring to graph measures,
and at the level of triadic interactions. In both Glasgow and Bristol, graph
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measures and typical patterns of microinteraction consistently suggest
civic networks to be much closer to polycentric, decentralized structures
based on balanced forms of interdependence than to hierarchical, cen-
tralized structures based on asymmetric forms of interdependence. Civic
organizations tend to gather in clusters of dense exchange and interaction
while they maintain levels of connectivity typical of integrated networks.
Then we show how such formal properties arise from patterns of local
interaction. The clustering and connectivity properties of a polycentric
structure are the by-product of the peculiar intersection of two types of
links: transactions and social bonds. While social bonds characterize areas
of intense interactions, transactions bridge those areas.
Finally, we look at the associational logics that induce organizations to
engage in such relational patterns. Civic organizations develop in-depth
relations with organizations with the same interests and develop instru-
mental, ad hoc alliances with organizations that are only marginally com-
mitted to their main goals. Consequently, they generate a web of inter-
actions tight enough to embed them in a distinctive environment, but
open enough to connect them to a broader and more heterogeneous group
of civic organizations.
In the conclusions, we summarize the polycentric model of civic co-
ordination that emerges from the research. We argue that civic networks
contribute to social integration when associations manage to achieve a
balance between instrumental relationships and ties that imply deeper
affective bonding. We also illustrate the implications of this finding for
current debates on associational life and social capital, as well as on the
influence of the political context over network structures.
KEY DIMENSIONS FOR THE STUDY OF CIVIC NETWORKS
There is obviously little novelty in stressing the interdependent, networked
nature of civic organizations. However, organizational interdependence
may take multiple forms, and interorganizational networks may display
a wide range of structures (Powell 1990). In order to understand collective
action dynamics and organizational strategies, the simple consideration
that civic organizations are “in touch with” each other is not sufficient.
We need to reconstruct how interorganizational ties combine in complex
structural patterns. In order to do so we can draw upon several bodies
of literature—including community studies, interorganizational relations,
and social movements. Analysts of community and policy networks have
been among the few to apply network analysis to relations between po-
litical organizations (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Kenis and Schneider
1991; Knoke 2001). In contrast, most studies of political coalitions in-
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volving participatory groups and associations have focused on the qual-
itative analysis of the logics accounting for actors’ coalitional behavior
rather than on the formal properties of those coalitions (e.g., Staggenborg
1986; Lichterman 1995; Rochon and Meyer 1997).
Even those scholars that actually mapped interorganizational relation-
ships usually treated networks as systems of opportunities and constraints
rather than as specific forms of social organization (Salancik 1995). On
the one hand, economic and organizational sociologists have mostly fo-
cused on the consequences of certain network structures for organizational
performance (Borgatti and Foster 2003). On the other hand, analysts of
political processes have paid more attention to the antecedents of net-
works, interpreting the latter as the result of the more or less successful
matching of organizational characteristics (Rosenthal et al. 1985; Ansell
2003; Osa 2003), or to the positional power held by actors occupying
certain structural positions (Galaskiewicz 1989; Knoke 1990; Jones et al.
2001). Either way, they have rarely considered network structures worth
investigation in their own right. In contrast, we argue that in order to
understand their potential for collective action and social integration, civic
networks have to be studied by looking at their overall properties and
explained on the basis of the microlevel dynamics that generate certain
macrolevel configurations (Lazega and Pattison 2001; Hedstro¨m 2005).
To this purpose we identify two analytical dimensions: the network formal
properties and the relational content of interorganizational ties.
Network Formal Properties
Civic networks may assume a range of forms. Studies of community
leadership as well as of social movements point at two different network
models, one hierarchical/centralized, the other more informal and poly-
centric. The contrast between these two forms has long characterized
political sociology, starting with classic studies of community leadership,
that either stressed the hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of elites
or the pluralistic nature of power structures (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961;
Polsby 1960). Even more recent explorations that drew heavily on network
analysis did not overcome the divide between a centralized, hierarchical
view of interorganizational networks (Knoke and Rogers 1979) and a more
complex, pluralistic, and issue-driven account of the structure of political
influence in local communities (Laumann and Pappi 1976; Laumann,
Galaskiewicz, and Marsden 1978).
Along similar lines, some scholars of social movements have stressed
the importance of a formal, bureaucratic structure and clear division of
labor in order to maximize movement outcomes and effective decision
making (Gamson 1975; Zald and McCarthy 1987), while others have
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suggested a decentralized informal model to be the most effective, given
the high adaptability and low vulnerability of a segmented structure to
environmental changes (Lichterman 1995; Melucci 1996). Among them,
Gerlach (2001) suggested a segmented, polycentric, and integrated struc-
ture—the so-called SPIN model—to be a powerful form of social move-
ment organization, as it allows actors to prevent effective repression, pen-
etrate into a variety of social niches through factionalism and schism,
adapt to circumstances, and promote innovation. The few empirical stud-
ies of movements as social networks have not always generated consistent
results: some have stressed the decentralized and multipolar nature of
those networks (Sawer and Groves 1994), while others have shown move-
ment networks to be highly centralized despite the informal nature of the
ties linking movement actors to each other (Lowe and Goyder 1983; Diani
2003).
None of the contributions mentioned above, however, has proposed a
formal account of the structure of political networks nor a systematic
discussion of its properties.2 Figure 1 reports an ideal-typical represen-
tation of a hierarchical and a polycentric structure. The two structures
have the same number of organizations (nodes), but they vary in the way
in which organizations relate to each other. A hierarchical structure is
characterized by one or few central organizations linked to a multiplicity
of peripheral actors that are disconnected from each other. In contrast, a
polycentric structure is characterized by multiple clusters of intense ex-
change among organizations, connected by few, sparse relations.3
Alternative network structures have a different impact on organiza-
tional strategies and collective action dynamics. At the macrolevel, they
may affect the potential for large-scale mobilization and network ro-
bustness (here understood as the resistance to external threats), such as,
for instance, the withdrawal of certain associations from the network; at
the microlevel, they may influence the nature of organizational interde-
pendence and the resulting power asymmetries and horizontal solidarity.
Let us consider the first two aspects. In hierarchical structures, core
actors’ attitudes and behavior may strongly affect the outcome of the
2 In contrast, studies of economic networks have more systematically focused on the
structural properties of interorganizational relations (Kenis and Knoke 2002; Kogut
and Walker 2001; Powell et al. 2005).
3 Locke refers to similar ideal-typical structures to account for the different ways in
which local economies underwent the transformation and restructuring of the Italian
economy. He argues that firms and unions embedded in polycentric sociopolitical net-
works were able to resolve conflicts through negotiations, whereas local actors involved
in hierarchical sociopolitical networks were more dependent on top-down decision
making and often negatively affected by the inertia of national authorities (Locke
1995).
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Fig. 1.—Ideal-typical network structures. Left: hierarchical structure; right: polycentric
structure.
collective effort, for their power of control, influence, and therefore the
potential for large-scale mobilization is high. At the same time, networks
of this sort are particularly exposed to the impact of exogenous effects: if
we remove from the network the core actors, whose commitment secures
network cohesiveness, the entire network collapses. In contrast, polycen-
tric structures consist of multiple, interconnected centers. In such config-
urations, power asymmetries are low. This means that while the mobi-
lization of a small number of actors does not necessary trigger large-scale
collective action, no single actors are really decisive for collective mobi-
lization as well as for network cohesion. In fact, the overall network might
be only marginally damaged by some actors’ defection or disappearance
(e.g., through repression: Gerlach and Hine [1970]). In sum, a hierarchical
form of civic coordination has higher potential for large-scale mobilization,
but it is less robust than a polycentric civic network.
Macrostructural properties imply certain microscale relational patterns.
In our case, the distinction between hierarchical and polycentric structures
is related, at the microlevel, to distinctive forms of organizational inter-
dependence. Usually, interorganizational analysis focuses on forms of de-
pendence asymmetry, that is, the “difference in actors’ dependencies on
each other in a dyadic exchange relationship” (Gulati and Sytch 2007, p.
32), and thus on issues of power and autonomy. However, organizational
interdependence can also be characterized by forms of joint dependence
and horizontal solidarity. For instance, alliance building among voluntary
associations is difficult and possibly risky, raising issues of agenda control,
choice of action repertoires, and compatibility of ideological perspectives
(Staggenborg 1986; Jones et al. 2001; McCammon and Campbell 2002).
For all these reasons, the choice of allies is a complex matter. For two
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organizations, being involved in alliances to the same third organization
in the context of different projects may facilitate the start of a direct
collaboration: consistent with the principles of balance theory (Cartwright
and Harary 1956; Heider 1958), third parties may testify to two organi-
zations’ mutual reliability.
We therefore investigate patterns of organizational interdependence at
the level of triadic interaction and differentiate between forms of asym-
metric interdependence, based on asymmetric relations between specific
pairs of actors and forms of balanced interdependence, in which reci-
procity and transitive relations are at work. Only the latter have the
potential to foster generalized reciprocity and sustain the horizontal sol-
idarity that, since Tocqueville, has been regarded as distinctive of civil
society. While asymmetric interdependence is typical of a hierarchical
structure, balanced forms of interdependence are likely to induce a po-
lycentric network structure.
To summarize, hierarchical civic networks can be very effective for the
mobilization of actors but at the same time very sensitive to defections
and/or external threats, and thus not robust. Moreover, hierarchical struc-
tures are based on relations of asymmetric interdependence that are not
likely to induce horizontal solidarity and generalized exchange. In con-
trast, in polycentric structures, mobilization processes are more likely to
depend on diffuse agreement among actors, which is costly, thus reducing
effectiveness, but at the same time, they are less likely to be damaged by
defections, therefore increasing robustness. Most important, microinter-
actions based on balanced dependence, instead of asymmetric dependence,
are likely to foster dynamics of generalized reciprocity. Assessing whether
real civic networks resemble a hierarchical or a polycentric structure is
therefore useful in order to evaluate their level of potential mobilization,
network robustness, and the nature of organizational interdependence.
The Content of Network Ties
While network formal properties are important, they cannot be fully un-
derstood without referring to the content of ties. As our analysis will show,
it is by referring to the interplay between form and content of network
ties that the peculiar structure of civic networks can be explained. Al-
though analysts of interorganizational dynamics have often looked at
content differentiation and tie multiplexity (Gould 1991; Knoke 2001;
Kenis and Knoke 2002), they have devoted less attention to their com-
position and interplay. Empirical research tends to focus on ties of a
specific kind and explore their function and strategic deployment. Among
formal ties, interlocking directorates have attracted huge attention, being
alternatively understood as systems of collusion, cooperation, control, or
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social cohesion (Mizruchi 1996). But the effectiveness of interorganiza-
tional relations does not depend on formal ties only. Following Granov-
etter’s argument on the social embeddedness of economic behavior (1985),
several studies have underlined the role of personal relations and friend-
ships between critical actors as means to generate mutual trust and re-
inforce social control (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian 1996; Walker,
Kogut, and Shan 1997; Ingram and Roberts 2000).
Similar considerations about the contents of interorganizational rela-
tions also characterize studies of community structures and social move-
ments. Laumann et al. (1978, p. 463) recognized two different kinds of
relations as relevant to interorganizational networks: (a) “linkages based
on resources transfers,” and (b) linkages based on “interpenetration of
organizational boundaries.” Both types were considered as having a pri-
marily instrumental basis, but “relations involving boundary interpene-
tration often have an additional component of solidarity maintenance
(ibidem).” Social movement scholars have also paid attention to both
aspects, recognizing the role of exchanges of resources, information, and
personnel between organizations as well as that of the less visible, “latent”
channels of communication represented by activists with multiple in-
volvements in organizations and subcultural milieus (Zald and McCarthy
1987; Staggenborg 1986; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Diani 1995, 2003).
In general, organizations may restrict their interactions to the exchange
of important resources for action, relevant political and technical infor-
mation, or specific facilities (e.g., office space). Although such exchanges
may create longer-term commitments and obligations, they also may end
without further consequences once the specific initiative that prompted
the coalition in the first place is over. Following Le´mieux (1998, pp. 47–
50), we refer to these links as transactions, primarily driven by an in-
strumental logic. Alternatively, organizations involved in alliances and
coalitions may be linked to each other by connections that imply deeper
obligations and solidarities than those usually attached to short-term in-
teractions. At the interorganizational level, examples of such ties are those
reflected in multiple memberships and in individuals’ participation in
multiple activities promoted by different organizations. Particularly in
organizations relying heavily—if not exclusively—on voluntary work, and
therefore on their members’ commitment, the sharing of activists by two
or more organizations, or the presence of extensive personal links between
them, may be regarded as an indicator of connections that are likely to
go beyond the purely instrumental level. Interorganizational links gen-
erated through individual members’ choices and connections may be re-
garded as social bonds (Le´mieux 1998, pp. 45–47), reflecting a logic of
belongingness.
Arguments related to links multiplexity are usually deployed when ac-
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counting for individual and organizational strategies, for asymmetries in
actors’ social influence, or in order to assess the function, quality, stability,
and strength of social relations. For instance, referring to a classical ex-
ample, the robustness of Medici’s action and the multivocality (ambiguity)
of their behavior mainly relied on the heterogeneity of their links—mar-
riage, economic, and patronage relations—and the cross-cutting networks
these generated (Padgett and Ansell 1993). However, the nature and mul-
tiplexity of social relations are not merely properties enabling or con-
straining actors. They may also play a role in shaping the network struc-
ture. It is this latter aspect that attracts our attention. More specifically,
we focus on the distribution of instrumental and affective ties across the
network, and we expect these ties to be responsible for civil society’s
micro- and macrointegration.
In general, macro- and microintegration are supposed to have different
bases. According to the most common view, microlevel integration within
cohesive groups is fostered by strong ties, while macrolevel integration
depends on weak ties that extend beyond groups (Granovetter 1973, 1983;
Blau 1974; Friedkin 1980). Namely, strong ties constitute a base for sol-
idarity and trust within primary groups, providing sustain in situations
of change and uncertainty (Krackhardt 1992), while weak ties reach out
beyond primary groups, favoring the circulation of information and re-
sources (Granovetter 1973, 1983). Transactions and social bonds can be
seen as a particular case of the broader distinction between weak and
strong ties, yet with an important qualification: while the original con-
ceptualization sees the strength of a tie as the combination of frequency
of interaction and both emotional and practical contents of the relation
(Granovetter 1973, p. 1361), in our case, the variation in the strength of
a tie consists of the qualitative difference between instrumental and af-
fective relationships.
In their reassessment of data from classical community studies of the
1970s (Laumann and Pappi 1976), Breiger and Pattison (1978, pp. 222–
24) found social ties between community leaders to be stronger than in-
strumental business-professional ties. Extending this argument to the or-
ganizational level, we expect that social bonds characterize clusters of
dense interaction between relatively similar organizations, while trans-
actions play the role of weak ties that bridge different groups and increase
the overall interconnection of civic networks.
According to this view, social bonds and transactions entail two opposite
relational tendencies: an in-group orientation that reinforces identities and
solidarity within certain collectivities and a bridging tendency that links
different groups and generates broader, encompassing identities. In the
extreme cases, a strong predominance of social bonds would end up frag-
menting the network into diverse groups of noncommunicating actors,
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while a civic network prevalently characterized by transactions would
reflect a random pattern of relations between individual organizations.
We expect real civic networks to lie somewhere in between these two
extreme models, emerging from a balance between transactions and social
bonds. We do not conceive these tendencies as alternative, and we expect
civil society associations to be involved in both types of relationships.
Burt convincingly maintains the complementary role of brokerage and
closure in bringing about social structures capable of enhancing the social
capital of their members (Burt 2005). Here, we build on his contribution,
showing how the simultaneity of brokerage and closure is made possible
by the interplay between different kinds of relationships.4
THE STUDY AND ITS CONTEXT
Research Design and Data
The data used in this article were collected in the context of a broader
project on networking by citizens’ organizations in local settings in Brit-
ain. We concentrated on urban areas such as Glasgow and Bristol because
of the density and complexity of their associational life and because cities
are, to some extent, more self-contained than other settings (which makes
it somewhat easier to draw population boundaries). We selected a time
period that was mainly characterized by ordinary forms of collective ac-
tion in order to maximize aspects of regularity in interorganizational dy-
namics. Finally, we surveyed two cities that differ with respect to their
social and political profile, in order to consider the impact of the political
context on civic network configurations.
Our study focused on participatory organizations promoting advocacy
and interest representation on a broad range of public issues. We excluded
from our sample organizations focusing exclusively on service delivery,
while we included organizations whose main focus was in that area as
long as they would engage at least in some type of political pressure. In
principle, it would have been desirable to map the whole set of organi-
zations promoting collective action on public issues, whether on a service
delivery or a protest-oriented basis. However, resource limitations and
the need to conduct costly face-to-face interviews, given the complexity
of data collection on networks, forced us to concentrate on organizations
active on a smaller set of issues. Altogether we collected data for 124
organizations in Glasgow and 134 in Bristol, whose main focus was evenly
4 In a more discursive vein, Putnam distinguishes between “bonding” and “bridging
social capital” as two complementary, but distinct, forms of social capital that are based
respectively on strong and weak ties (Putnam 1993, 2000).
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distributed among environmental issues, ethnic and migration issues, com-
munity issues, and social exclusion issues, but for a slight overrepresen-
tation of environmental groups in Bristol and ethnic and migrants’ groups
in Glasgow (table 1).
Environmental issues included both classic conservation themes, as rep-
resented by organizations like the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds,
and urban ecology issues, as exemplified by the agenda of groups like the
Bristol Cycling Campaign or JAM74, a coalition opposing the extension
of the motorway 74 in Glasgow (not to mention nationwide organizations
such as Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace). Ethnic and migration issues
covered both a broad agenda on multiculturalism, equal opportunities,
citizenship rights, and minority members’ access to educational and wel-
fare provisions, and a more specific agenda promoting migration-related—
in particular, asylum seekers’—interests. These were the target of initia-
tives promoted by organizations acting on behalf of specific
communities—most notably, the Pakistani, Indian, and Afro-Caribbean
communities—and by broader coalitions such as the Glasgow Welcomes
Refugees Campaign or the Bristol Defends Asylum Seekers Campaign.
Community issues included a whole range of themes related to the welfare
of local communities and neighborhoods, from community development
to the quality of service provision to local crime. Once again they were
acted upon by a broad range of actors ranging from neighborhood as-
sociations such as the Easton Community Centre in Bristol or the Govan
Community Organization in Glasgow to single-issue campaigns, such as
the initiatives opposing the sale of Glasgow council housing on the private
market. Finally, social exclusion issues included all aspects of social in-
equality, from unemployment to education to poverty, addressed both at
the local and at the national—or even global—level. They were taken up
by a highly heterogeneous set of organizations, from voluntary associa-
tions focusing on capacity building in the community—for example, the
Poverty Alliance in Glasgow—to direct action groups and coalitions such
as the Bristol Housing Action Movement or Globalize Resistance.
We chose to focus on these four main issues because they were dis-
tinctive enough to be the object of specific action by specific organizations,
while being at the same time amenable to attempts to merge them in
broader and more encompassing agendas. For a study aiming at recon-
structing network practices, it was important to look at issues that neither
forced citizens’ organizations to collaborate, given the almost entire over-
lap between them, nor kept them apart due to their incompatibility. For
example, while a lot of—possibly, most—actions on environmental issues
could be promoted by coalitions involving primarily environmental
groups—or even specific organizations trying to acquire “ownership” of
a specific issue—this was by no means necessary. They might have been
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TABLE 1
Organizational Characteristics in Bristol and Glasgow
Variable Description Bristol (Np134; %) Glasgow (Np124; %)
Most important issue:
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 16
Ethnic minorities and mi-
grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 28
Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 23
Social exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 33
Scale of activity:
Neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 27
Citywide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 32
Regional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 21
National or transnational . . . 15 20
Years of activity in 2002:
1–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 32
6–10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 15
11–20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 24
120 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 29
No. of registered members:
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 44
1–1,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 44
11,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12
No. of paid staff members
(full- and part-time):
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 35
1–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 35
6–20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 16
120 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 14
Budget:
None . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7
Under £10,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 24
£10,000–£99,999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 35
Over £100,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 34
Level of formalization:a
Low (0–3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 21
Medium (4–6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 43
High (7–9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 36
a Additive index based on nine indicators: chairperson, board of directors, executive and/or special
committee, secretary, treasurer, written constitution, general assembly, charity status.
as plausibly promoted—in fact, in many cases they were promoted—by
coalitions involving other types of actors, such as community groups, or
organizations fighting social exclusion from an “environmental justice
perspective.” Likewise, it is easy to think of, and to record in reality,
examples of collaborations between groups linking ethnic minority issues
to global environmental ones, or linking social exclusion at the local and
the global level with opposition to war and support of human rights.
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While nothing prevented the organizations we studied from acting mainly
as independent organizations on their own specialized ground, or within
the boundaries of narrowly defined organizational fields, it was similarly
possible for them to bridge their own issue priorities in broader agendas
more similar to those promoted by large-scale coalitions and, possibly,
social movements.
In order to identify our unit of analysis, we started from the directories
of organizations generated by the umbrella organizations operating as
service providers to the voluntary and community sector in the two cities,
GCVS (Glasgow Council for the Voluntary Sector) and Voscur (Bristol’s
Voluntary Organisations Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration).
We supplemented the information collected through those sources with
data from a limited number of informants, either representatives of the
main umbrella organizations and of related bodies such as the Bristol
Racial Equality Council or the Glasgow Minority Network, or academics
with specific research experience in the local scene. We included all the
organizations that, according to our informants, played a significant role
at least at the city level (for an example of case selection based on rep-
utation see Laumann and Knoke [1987]). As for community organizations,
rather than taking a small sample from across the city, efforts were con-
centrated on two areas, both relatively deprived. These were the Southside
in Glasgow, an area with a massive historical presence of the working
class, and which included neighborhoods such as Govan, Govanhill, Gor-
bals, and Pollokshields; and the area including the neighborhoods of
Easton, Knowles, Withywood, and Hartcliffe in Bristol, featuring a strong
presence of ethnic minorities. If, during the interviews, other organizations
not included in our original list were named as important allies by our
respondents, they were noted and interviewed after at least three refer-
ences had been made.5
Data were collected between 2001 and 2002 through face-to-face in-
terviews with organization representatives. These would normally be the
contact people listed in the local directories or, when this information was
unavailable, indicated by our informants or interviewees. We made sure
that our interviewees were familiar with the life of their organization in
the previous years—a possible problem, particularly with professional
staff. Interviews normally lasted between one and two hours and were
based on a questionnaire consisting largely of a predetermined list of items,
5 We have strong reasons to believe that with the exception of one ethnic organization
in Bristol, all the most central organizations in the two cities were contacted; while
many organizations were mentioned by respondents (over 500 in both cities), none
received more than three nominations.
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plus a smaller number of open questions.6 Only one interview was refused,
by a Bristolian group that was central in the ethnic and migrants network
but was going through a serious—if temporary—organizational crisis.
The organizations we interviewed differed substantially on a number
of organizational indicators (table 1):
1. About one-quarter of them had been established in the last five
years, while a similar share had been in operation for over 20 years
(some of them actually dating back to the late 19th century).
2. About one-quarter focused on specific neighborhoods, while four in
ten operated mainly at the city level, and the rest combined local
action with action at the national or transnational level.
3. A proportion ranging from one-third in Bristol to almost half in
Glasgow had no formal membership, while about one in ten had a
local membership exceeding 1,000.
4. About one-third had yearly budgets below £10,000 and could not
count on any paid staff, not even on a part-time basis, while about
one-tenth had budgets exceeding £100,000 and more than 20
staffers.
5. About one-quarter scored very low on a nine-point scale of orga-
nizational formalization, while another quarter was highly
formalized.
Respondents were asked to name up to five most important allies on
the basis of the following question: “Please list up to five groups/orga-
nizations with which you collaborate most intensely.” While they were
not submitted any predetermined list as a stimulus, later in the interview
they were also asked whether, on top of the five partners already men-
tioned, they had any connection to organizations in any of the following
types: environmental groups, ethnic minority and migrant organizations,
community organizations, unions and other economic interest groups, re-
ligious organizations, political parties, other political organizations, other
voluntary associations, or any other organization. Participation in a for-
mally constituted organization, coordinating a number of different groups
on a specific campaign, was recorded as an interorganizational tie, similar
to an alliance between two any other formally independent organizations.
We also urged respondents to specify the content of the link, in order
to qualify the nature of the tie. Specifically, we asked whether the tie
implied (1) the conducting of joint projects, (2) the sharing of information,
(3) the pooling of resources,7 (4) the sharing of core members, or (5) the
6 Questionnaire available from the authors.
7 While the conducting of joint projects implies shared information and resources, the
reverse does not necessarily apply. Organizations may also collaborate through regular
exchanges of information, or through the pooling of resources (a classic example being
sharing offices).
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presence of activists with strong personal ties to each other. We opera-
tionalized transactions as those links that only consist of exchanges of
resources, as measured by tie types 1–3. In contrast, social bonds are
multiplex links which can be seen as the composition of “transactions”
and “personal ties,” measured by ties 4–5. The latter links clearly imply
actors stressing the elements common to them in a logic of collective
membership to a group, however defined.8 We did not measure the in-
tensity of the ties, but merely their presence or absence, as it has been
repeatedly shown that respondents’ accuracy in recording the presence
of ties is not usually matched by a similar accuracy in reporting about
its intensity (Marsden 1990). Moreover, we were most interested in iden-
tifying the alliances that each organization regarded as most important,
rather than in contrasting intensity or frequency of interaction, which is
by definition strongly dependent on other factors such as organizations’
overall centrality or size.9
Socioeconomic and Political Context
Bristol and Glasgow share some basic social and political traits. They
have both experienced a drastic move from an industrial to a service-
based economy. Since the closure of the docks and most of the heavy
industry in the 1960s–70s, working-class presence in both cities has been
increasingly modest, with employment in the manufacturing industry in
the early 2000s accounting for about 10% of the workforce in Glasgow
and 11% in Bristol.10 In political terms, they have both experienced the
increase in opportunities for formal institutional access brought about by
New Labour since the late 1990s, the trends toward the professionalization
of the voluntary sector, and its growing involvement in policy design and
implementation, usually in partnerships with business and local govern-
ment (Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2001; Taylor 2003). However, dif-
ferences outweigh analogies by far.
With respect to the occupational structure and welfare, Bristol has a
8 In principle one could also conceive of situations in which organizations are involved
in the same sub- or countercultural milieus, organizational industries, or movement
sectors through the multiple forms of participation and the personal connections of
their members (ties of the type 4–5), yet are not engaged in any type of resource
exchange (Melucci 1996; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Given the focus of this study on
civic, public-oriented collective action, those ties are not considered here.
9 For example, one monthly meeting between a neighborhood environmental group
and a major environmental association may be a strong tie for the former but a weak
tie for the latter.
10 The local statistics reported in this article are from the 2001 UK Census and are
available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/Census2001. In 2001, Bristol counted 380,000
residents, Glasgow, 630,000.
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strong presence of professional bourgeoisie and highly qualified white
collar workers, even though areas of relative deprivation undoubtedly
exist, some of which are included in this study. Its main employers are
high-tech firms like those in the aeronautic industry, firms in the service
sector, especially the financial sector, and big public employers such as
the ministry of defense. This is reflected in a population with a higher
proportion of degree holders and professionals/managers than in Glasgow
(25% vs. 18% and 28% vs. 21%, respectively). Bristol is also significantly
more affluent than Glasgow. At the start of the new millennium, unem-
ployment rates were substantially higher in Glasgow than in Bristol (5%
vs. 3%), with long-term unemployment in particular representing a major
problem (37% of the unemployed vs. 25% in Bristol). Housing was another
major issue, with 39% of the population still living in council flats (vs.
21% in Bristol) and 17% living in homes with no central heating (vs. 9%).
The ethnic scene is also larger and more diversified in Bristol. Over
8% of the 2001 residents were born outside the United Kingdom, with
some neighborhoods approaching 20% of minority residents, versus 5%
in Glasgow. Both the Asian and black (mostly Afro-Caribbean) com-
munities are well represented (2.8% and 2.3%, respectively). In contrast,
black communities are hardly present in Glasgow, while Pakistanis are
the dominant minority group, outnumbering the Indians and the Chinese
by two to one.
These differences translate in what are in many ways two different
political cultures. Despite the conversion of Glasgow toward a more di-
versified and more service-driven economy, the persisting levels of dep-
rivation in some areas maintain a huge potential for collective action
addressing social inequality and related issues. This has facilitated the
continuing central role in local politics of working-class and left-wing
labor politics, while the strength of the Pakistani community vis a` vis
other minority groups has also encouraged and reproduced their integra-
tion in the Labour political machine. One should also remember the role
of the center-periphery (Nationalist) cleavage and the religious (Protestant
vs. Catholic) cleavage in fostering a polarized political culture.
City politics in Bristol have also been dominated by Labour since the
1980s (at least until the May 2003 local elections), but the overall profile
of the city is very different, with a history of swings between Labour and
Tories in the context of an overall moderate political culture. Pooled data
for the two cities from the four waves of the British Social Attitudes
survey, covering the years in which this project was conducted (2000–
2003), well illustrate differences in the role of Labour relative to other
political parties. While the share of Labour sympathizers is fairly similar
(50% in Glasgow as opposed to 46% in Bristol), the ratio of Labour
supporters to supporters of other major parties is drastically different in
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the two cases: they outnumber Conservative supporters by fourteen to
one in Glasgow and by two to one in Bristol, and Liberal-Democrat
supporters by ten to one in Glasgow and by four to one in Bristol. While
Glasgow has been a stronghold of left-wing political groupings critical of
the Labour party (the latest and most successful being the Scottish So-
cialist Party), similar groups have never achieved organizational strength
in Bristol despite a small, very active community of radical activists in-
dependent from any formal organization. A distinctive trait of Bristol
civic culture is what one of the activists interviewed for this project de-
scribed as a “laid-back political culture,” that is, a style of politics in which
radical polarization along major class divides comes second to the con-
certed attempts to mediate between multiple interests. Even the impact
of the new social movements in Bristol has mostly been at the cultural
level. The city has been one of the main centers for cultural innovation,
with a flourishing milieu of youth subcultures and alternative lifestyles
addressing issues of health, alternative food, and body care (Purdue et al.
1997).
We checked if the greater perceived salience of the left-right, class-
based cleavage in Glasgow also emerged from patterns of interorgani-
zational alliances; if, in other words, organizations tended to interact with
organizations with the same political affiliation. To this purpose we run
categorical autocorrelations based on a model of variable homophily (Bor-
gatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002) in order to test the hypothesis that
organizations affiliated with the Labour Party and other leftist parties
were more likely to engage in alliances among themselves than with other
organizations. Homophily coefficients turned out to be larger in Glasgow
than in Bristol (.043 vs. .017), and the model was statistically significant
only in the former, to confirm the persistent salience of the class cleavage
in Glasgow, and its limited relevance in Bristol.
RESULTS
Hierarchical versus Polycentric Network Structures
Our first analytical dimension differentiates at the macrolevel between
hierarchical and polycentric structures, and at the microlevel between
asymmetric and balanced forms of interorganizational interdependence.
Let us start by looking at four graph-level measures that describe the
macrolevel features of civic networks. Two of these measures—hierarchy
and connectedness—evaluate the proximity of civic networks to hierar-
chical structures (Krackhardt 1994). Instead, the view of civic networks
as polycentric structures is related to two characteristic measures of small-
world graphs—clustering and average path length (Watts 1999). Krack-
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hardt’s graph hierarchy assesses the degree of asymmetry in relations
among organizations, based on the assumption that in an ideal hierarchical
structure, relations are completely asymmetric.11 Graph hierarchy is a
function of “the fraction of connected pairs that are asymmetric in their
ability to reach one another” (Anderson, Butts, and Carley 1999, p. 240).
While graph hierarchy captures the overall level of asymmetry in rela-
tional patterns, connectedness catches the overall level of connectivity
among actors.12 Connectedness is defined as the fraction of all the pairs
that are not disconnected. In a pure hierarchical structure, connectedness
is one, because all the organizations are linked to higher-level units and,
ultimately, to the organization at the highest level. In a nonhierarchical
structure, instead, organizations do not necessarily refer to the same head
unit and therefore might be disconnected from each other.
In contrast, a polycentric structure can be approximated by small-world
graphs, which are characterized by clusters of dense interaction loosely
linked to each other (Watts 1999). Distinctive of small-world graphs is
the fact that the presence of few links that span across different areas of
local interaction determines high levels of network connectivity despite
the segmented and polycentric nature of the network. Relevant measures
are clustering coefficient and average path length. The clustering coeffi-
cient of an actor can be thought of as a measure of the cliquishness of
the actor’s network, and it refers to “the degree to which a person’s
acquaintances are acquainted with each other” (Watts 1999, p. 33). In our
context, it captures the extent to which civic organizations are embedded
in highly dense clusters of interaction.13 While the clustering coefficient
measures the level of organizational embeddedness in dense clusters of
exchange, the average path length (or mean geodesic distance) is a global
measure of separation that captures the level of interconnection among
different clusters by looking at the overall reachability between organi-
11 Krackhardt’s degree of hierarchy is defined as graph hierarchy p 1[V/MaxV],
where V is the number of unordered pairs of points that are symmetrically linked (A
is linked to B and B is linked to A), and Max V is the number of unordered pairs of
points that are asymmetrically linked (A is linked to B or B is linked to A) (Krackhardt
1994, p. 97).
12 Connectedness is defined as connectedness p 1[V/N(N1)/2)], which is the total
number of mutually reachable pairs divided by the maximum number of possible pair
combinations (Krackhardt 1994, p. 96).
13 Technically, the clustering coefficient of an actor refers to the density of its open
neighborhood. Defining a neighborhood of actor A as the subgroup of actors that are
connected with A, the clustering coefficient is the probability that two members of
such neighborhood will be connected. A graph-level measure of clustering is then
computed as the mean of the clustering coefficients for all the actors.
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zations.14 In general, random graphs have short path lengths, for there
are no preferential rules in determining connections. In contrast, social
networks usually show longer paths than random graphs, as social in-
teractions do not reflect randomness but various criteria of social
segmentation.
Interestingly, the two ideal-typical network structures considered here—
the hierarchical and the polycentric—do not necessarily show opposite
features with respect to the measures considered. While hierarchy and
clustering are respectively high and low in a hierarchical structure, and
low and high in a polycentric one, high connectedness and reachability
(which means short average path length) might be observed in both struc-
tures, but for different reasons. In highly centralized networks, short dis-
tances between nodes are due to the presence of one or a few central
nodes, to which almost all the other nodes are connected. In a small world
structure, instead, connectivity properties are due to a few links that
connect widely separated parts of the graph. Of course, actual measures
of hierarchy and clustering will allow us to assess which connectivity
mechanism is in place.
We compared Glasgow and Bristol civic networks with simulated ran-
dom graphs that retain the same size and degree distribution of the ob-
served networks. Random networks of this sort resemble a scenario in
which organizations do not have any specific preference in choosing their
alliance partners. Differences between observed and simulated networks
are interpreted as the outcome of specific dynamics of interaction. This
analytic strategy (previously used by Bearman, Moody, and Stovel [2004])
not only provides a criterion for the evaluation of observed networks, it
also allows us to compare the two cities with respect to their structural
characteristics, notwithstanding their differences in network size and den-
sity. Substantively, this means to compare our observed civic networks
with the networks that would emerge from the same population of or-
ganizations if their patterns of interaction were not affected by any specific
criteria in the choice of their allies. Of course, we expect social networks
to be different from random ones. How they differ is the issue at stake
here.
We drew 1,000 simulations from the observed degree distribution and
computed the four measures of interest for each simulated graph. Sim-
ulated networks provide a distribution of values with which the observed
value index is contrasted. Box plots in figure 2 show the distribution of
simulated graphs across measures of hierarchy, connectedness, average
path length, and clustering coefficient. The whiskers extend to the most
14 Technically, it is the mean distance among reachable pairs and is computed as the
mean of the shortest geodesic distance for each connected pair.
Civic Networks
755
Fig. 2.—Graph measures of hierarchical and polycentric structures. For each of the four
structural measures of interest (hierarchy, connectedness, average path length, and cluster-
ing), the plot compares values for observed networks (dots) to the distribution of values
obtained from 1,000 simulated random graphs with preserved degree distribution (box plots).
Whiskers extend to the most extreme datapoint that is no more than 1.5 times the inter-
quartile range from the box. Glasgow and Bristol.
extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the interquartile range
from the box. Dots indicate the actual value for Glasgow and Bristol.
A first, nontrivial result concerns the similarities between the two cities.
When contrasted with simulated graphs, both Glasgow and Bristol show
the same structural properties: dark dots are positioned exactly in the
same way with respect to the box plots. Moreover, results are fairly clear
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with respect to which alternative structure civic networks resemble. In
fact, observed networks show lower levels of graph hierarchy than ex-
pected by chance, while they have significantly higher levels of clustering.
This means that civic organizations are involved in nonhierarchical pat-
terns of exchange and tend to create areas of dense interaction; interor-
ganizational collaboration takes place within clusters of intense activity,
in which common partners contribute to the creation and maintenance
of a reliable environment.
Both measures of connectivity are higher than expected by chance, but,
as we know, their interpretation can vary. Although hierarchical structures
are expected to show high levels of connectedness, the very same property
also characterizes polycentric structures. Given the low graph hierarchy
here observed, connectedness is not related to the role of few central actors
but to the spanning capability of polycentric structures. At the same time,
observed civic networks do not fully resemble small-world graphs, for
the reason that the average path length is still longer than expected by
chance, if more pronouncedly in Bristol than in Glasgow. This further
suggests the presence of some degree of segmentation in both civic
networks.
Overall, the Glasgow and Bristol civic networks are decentralized, po-
lycentric models of interorganizational relations in which a tendency to
form clusters of dense interaction and exchange couples with the presence
of links between clusters that facilitate general network connectivity. As
previously discussed, in a polycentric network, coordinated action is more
likely to depend on the diffuse agreement among actors, and its overall
stability is unlikely to be threatened by few defections. Moreover, we
expect polycentric structures to be based on microinteractions of balanced
interdependence. Further evidence on this comes from the analysis of
microlevel patterns of interorganizational alliances.
Asymmetric versus Balanced Interdependence
A common approach to the study of micropatterns of relation is by looking
at triadic interactions. As previously discussed, organizational interde-
pendence might rely on asymmetric or balanced relationships. Asymmetric
interdependence is reflected in patterns of microinteraction characterized
by unidirectional relations, most particularly in the so-called star triads—
interactions in which one organization plays a pivotal role in connecting
other organizations. They are typical features of hierarchical structures
and are likely to reflect ad hoc exchanges, mostly driven by instrumental
calculations. In turn, balanced interdependence is captured by microlevel
exchanges that take the form of mutual and transitive triads and bring
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about polycentric or, more generally, small world structures (Robins, Pat-
tison, and Woolcock 2005).
Given three organizations (nodes) and assuming directed links between
them, we can observe in any given network up to 16 triadic configurations.
Triads are classified accordingly (see table 2). Here, in addition to asym-
metric and balanced, we consider mixed triads as those triads combining
both asymmetric and balanced ties. Each triadic configuration represents
a scheme of interactions that is more or less likely to happen, or that can
simply occur by chance. We contrast the number of observed triads with
the triad distribution of 1,000 random graphs with preserved degree dis-
tribution. Each triadic configuration is considered overrepresented if the
number of observed triads is higher than the value obtained in more than
95% of simulated graphs; it is underrepresented if the number of triads
is lower than the value observed in more than 95% of simulated graphs.
Otherwise, we conclude that a triadic configuration does not significantly
differ from what can be observed by chance. Table 2 reports the triads
that are significantly under- or overrepresented in either city, differenti-
ating triads according to three forms of organizational interdependence:
asymmetric, balanced, and mixed.
The strong similarity between the two civic networks is evident even
at a glance. With the exception of two triadic configurations that are
nonsignificant in Glasgow but significant in Bristol, all the other config-
urations are over- or underrepresented in the same way and with com-
parable magnitude.15 Thus, despite the historical and social differences
that characterize the two cities and their collective experiences, interor-
ganizational collaborations are built upon the same skeleton.
Substantively, we find that those triads that are expressions of asym-
metric interdependence are systematically underrepresented, while in-
stances of balanced interdependence largely prevail. Three aspects deserve
to be highlighted here, starting with the tendency toward reciprocity,
characteristic of a large variety of social networks. As it can be observed,
overrepresented triads all show dynamics of interaction that involve at
least one reciprocated tie. A second relevant aspect concerns the diffusion
of triangles and “cliquing triads” (triads with a large number or even all
the possible links), which are indicators of balanced interdependence.
Interorganizational relations are more likely to unfold in dense subgroups
of interaction rather than among almost disconnected actors. Different
from a hierarchical structure, where intense exchanges among few major
organizations combine with a large periphery of organizations, discon-
15 Strong similarities between the structure of the two networks are also observable
computing p* models (exponential random graph Markov chains, order 3) that account
for the network structure considering third-order interaction effects.
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TABLE 2
Asymmetric and Balanced Forms of Triadic Interaction
Overrepresented Triads Underrepresented Triads
Glasgow Bristol Glasgow Bristol
Asymmetric
interdependence
021D 021D
021U 021U
021C 021C
Balanced
interdependence
102 102 030C 030C
120D 120D 030T
120U 120U
120C 120C
210
300 300
Mixed
interdependence
111D 111D
111U 111U
201 201
Note.—The table reports triads that are over- or underrepresented in 95% or more of the cases
compared to the distribution of 1,000 simulated random graphs with fixed-degree distribution. Glas-
gow and Bristol.
nected from each other and poorly connected to the core members, we
observe a lack of sparse relationships in favor of dense patterns of ex-
change. This is ultimately established by a third relevant aspect of civic
networks, namely, the scarcity of two-star triads, indicators of asymmetric
dependence and consequently of hierarchical structure. There is only one
instance in which two-star triples are overrepresented: in mixed form of
interdependence when combined with mutual triples. While a two-star
pattern of interaction suggests an asymmetric relation, a mutual tie rep-
resents an alternative tendency toward reciprocity, which naturally lessens
the meaning of asymmetric relations.
Consistent with the findings at the macrolevel, Glasgow and Bristol
civic networks are centered on dynamics of balanced interdependence. A
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logic of embeddedness, mutual recognition, and joint action prevails over
a logic of power and asymmetric exchanges. As previously discussed, these
microlevel dynamics are the building blocks of generalized reciprocity in
which the meaning of the exchange extends to third actors and thus
aliments forms of horizontal solidarity.
Our next task is to explain how this model of polycentric coordination
is generated through local interactions. One fruitful way to deal with the
question is to understand network properties as a “macro implication of
one aspect of small-scale interaction” (Granovetter 1973, p. 1360), spe-
cifically, the nature of network ties and their role in shaping the network
as a whole. So far, we did not differentiate between types of ties. In the
next section, we show that the nature of ties actually matters.
TRANSACTIONS AND SOCIAL BONDS AS DETERMINANTS OF
NETWORK STRUCTURES
A fascinating aspect of polycentric structures of coordination is that their
properties of clustering and connectivity, while originated from the same
web of interactions, are the outcome of two conflicting tendencies. The
dynamic of subgroup interaction, as it implies processes of identity con-
struction, maintenance, and reproduction, originates from a tendency to-
ward “particularization” and “distinction,” and therefore toward closure
into clusters of dense interaction. An opposite force is at work in bridging
otherwise separate groups, entailing generalized patterns of interaction,
hence openness. On the one hand, clustering processes imply specific,
individual-oriented relations; on the other hand, connectivity and reach-
ability imply interaction with a sort of “generalized other.”16
Differentiating between different types of relations might be helpful for
disentangling this otherwise puzzling pattern of interaction. Earlier, we
suggested that civic networks can be better understood as the composition
and interplay of two different kinds of relations: transactions and social
bonds. In particular, we expected social bonds to have a central role within
subgroups, while transactions should operate mainly as connections
among subgroups. Here, we test if the distinction between transactions
and social bonds is useful to capture patterns of microinteraction and
explain the emergence of structural properties of clustering and
connectivity.
16 Analytically, the argument could be reversed: “The quality of a dyadic relationship
fundamentally changes as a function of the overall structure in which the relationship
is embedded” (Krackhardt 1994, p. 21).
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Social Bonds “Within” and Transactions “Between”
In order to test whether social bonds actually characterize dense clusters
within broader networks, while transactions facilitate links between al-
most disconnected subgroups, we first need a graph partition that is able
to capture the community structure of the observed civic networks: spe-
cifically, “the division of network nodes into groups within which the
network connections are dense, but between which they are sparser”
(Newman and Girvan 2004, p. 1). We use Newman and Girvan’s graph
partitioning method, based on an iterative removal of edges for identifying
cohesive areas of exchange. This enables us to differentiate several clusters
and investigate relations “within” and “between” groups. Figure 3 shows
the ten clusters that form the community structure of Bristol’s civic net-
work and distinguish between transactions (black lines) and social bonds
(white lines).17 Table 3 reports the distribution of ties for each cluster,
differentiating between transactions and social bonds. Thus, “within” col-
umns indicate how many ties connect nodes located in the same cluster,
while “between” columns report ties from nodes in one cluster to nodes
in other clusters.18
We expect the web within clusters to be characterized by (and to develop
through) social bonds; on the contrary, we see the connection among
clusters as more likely to arise through transactions. Consequently, we
expect a different ratio of social bonds and transactions in within and
between clusters. In general, in Bristol there are 1.3 social bonds for each
transaction. If we consider only relations within clusters, this ratio grows
to 1.7 and decreases to .5 for the links between groups. Therefore, in the
exchange between organizations in different clusters, we have two trans-
actions for each social bond.
In order to account for differences among clusters in the general dis-
tribution of social bonds and transactions, each within (or between) ratio
of cluster x has been standardized by dividing it by the overall ratio of
cluster x.
socbonds /transin inx xindex pin socbonds /transall allx x
17 We requested 12 clusters, a number that was reduced to 10 because in two clusters
there were only one and two nodes (not enough to speak about groups, interaction,
etc.). These three nodes have been placed in the cluster with which they have the
highest number of links.
18 We refer to the number of nodes rather than to the number of links because this
facilitates the comparison between in and out. If we referred to the number of links,
it would be difficult to account for the number of links between clusters. Anyway, the
number within each group can be easily computed as the number of nodes/2.
Fig. 3.—Community structure in Bristol. The graph shows the clusters obtained using the Newman-Girvan partitioning algorithm. Isolated orga-
nizations are listed vertically in the bottom right corner of the table. The shape of the nodes indicates the type of organization: environmental (square),
ethnic minorities and migrants (triangle), community (circle), and social exclusion and human rights (diamond). Black ties are transactions, and white
ties are social bonds.
TABLE 3
Distribution of Transactions and Social Bonds within and between Clusters in Bristol
Social Bonds Transactions
Social Bonds/
Transactions Index
Clusters
No. of
Nodes Within Between All Within Between All Within Between All Within Between
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nine isolates
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 1 7 2 1 3 3.0 1.0 2.3 1.3 .4
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 136 10 146 70 24 94 1.9 .4 1.6 1.3 .3
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8 4 12 18 2 20 .4 2.0 .6 .7 3.3
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 52 7 59 30 8 38 1.7 .9 1.6 1.1 .6
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 3 7 0 4 4 () .8 1.8 () .4
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 4 8 4 7 11 1.0 .6 .7 1.4 .8
8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12 1 13 6 8 14 2.0 .1 .9 2.2 .1
9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 1 5 2 2 4 2.0 .5 1.3 1.6 .4
10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 20 1 21 12 10 22 1.7 .1 1.0 1.7 .1
Total . . . . . . . . . 245 33 278 145 65 210 1.7 .5 1.3 1.3 .4
Note.—Number of within and between links by clusters and relative indexes. Newman and Girvan’s graph partitioning method.
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This index can be interpreted as follows: the chance to observe a social
bond rather than a transaction within the cluster x is number of index
times higher than expected according to the overall distribution of social
bonds and transactions of cluster x. For instance, in the within relations
of cluster 2, a social bond is 1.3 times more likely to be present than
expected according to the overall distribution of transactions and social
bonds in cluster 2.
In sum, both the general ratio (social bonds/transactions) and the ratios
of each cluster show that, all the rest being equal, organizations in the
same cluster are more likely to exchange through social bonds (in fact,
all values are higher than one, except for cluster 4), while organizations
from different clusters have a higher chance to be linked through trans-
actions. We obtained similar results also for Glasgow, where six clusters
were identified (fig. 4; table 4).19
So far we observed that different types of relations take place among
organizations and that they are differently distributed across different
clusters in the network. To demonstrate that the peculiar distribution of
transactions and social bonds is actually responsible for shaping civic
network structures, we now randomly rewire either transactions or social
bonds and consider changes in relevant structural measures with respect
to the observed civic networks.20 This procedure enables us to infer to
what extent observed structural properties are due to the peculiar con-
figuration of links or are simply determined by chance (Bearman et al.
2004).
In general, given the polycentric structure of civic networks, a random
rewiring of links should reduce clustering and increase the level of hi-
erarchy. This is due to the fact that introducing random patterns of in-
teraction weakens the network tendency toward forms of balanced in-
terdependence. Since we argue that social bonds are mainly responsible
for such clustering tendency, we expect the random rewiring of social
bonds to have a stronger impact on hierarchy and clustering than the
random rewiring of transactions.
Similarly, a random rewiring of links should increase network connec-
tivity (specifically, it should induce higher connectedness and shorter path
length), since random networks minimize redundant links, thus maxi-
mizing reachability. According to our theory, transactions are supposed
to be mainly responsible for levels of network connectivity. Given that
19 We obtained eight clusters, then reduced to six because two clusters were composed
by less than three nodes. Remaining nodes have been assigned to the clusters to which
they were connected.
20 Specifically, we select edges at random and rewire the end point to a randomly
chosen node.
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Fig. 4.—Community structure in Glasgow. The graph shows the clusters obtained using the Newman-Girvan partitioning algorithm. Isolated
organizations are listed vertically in the bottom right corner of the table. The shape of the nodes indicates the type of organization: environmental
(square), ethnic minorities and migrants (triangle), community (circle), and social exclusion and human rights (diamond). Black ties are transactions,
and white ties are social bonds.
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TABLE 4
Distribution of Transactions and Social Bonds within and between Clusters in Glasgow
Social Bonds Transactions
Social Bonds/
Transactions Index
Clusters
No. of
Nodes Within Between All Within Between All Within Between All Within Between
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 isolates
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6 1 7 18 8 26 .3 .1 .3 1.24 .46
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 1 7 6 5 11 1.0 .2 .6 1.57 .31
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 0 6 8 9 17 .8 .0 .4 2.13 0
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 0 2 10 7 17 .2 .0 .1 1.70 0
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 124 2 126 395 30 425 .3 .1 .3 1.06 .22
Total . . . . . . . . . 124 144 4 148 437 59 496 .3 .1 .3 1.104 .227
Note.—Number of within and between links by clusters and relative indexes. Newman and Girvan’s graph partitioning method.
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network connectivity in polycentric networks is usually due to few random
links that span across dense clusters of interaction, we expect the effect
of transactions to resemble that of those random ties. In the extreme case,
one in which transactions are not affected by any selectivity in the choice
of partners, the effect of their rewiring on connectivity measures should
be null. In reality, the impact of transaction rewiring on connectivity
measures is expected to be lower than that of social bonds, as the former
ties are less affected by selectivity criteria and thus more likely to connect
otherwise disconnected groups.
We ran 1,000 simulations rewiring either transactions or social bonds
and computed the mean values for the four graph-level indexes previously
introduced—hierarchy, connectedness, average path length, and cluster-
ing. In figure 5 we contrast these values with the box-plot distributions
presented in figure 2. The squares indicate the mean value for the rewiring
of transactions, while the triangles refer to the rewiring of social bonds.
The dark dots report, as before, the value for the observed networks.
The tests produce once again similar results in both cities and confirm
that the nature of links matters. This is particularly evident for measures
of hierarchy and clustering. The random rewiring of social bonds reduces
the level of clustering observed in the network by a much higher amount
than the rewiring of transactions. Social bonds are also strongly respon-
sible for the low level of hierarchy observed in the network. In fact, when
these ties are rewired, the measure of hierarchy strongly increases. On
the contrary, transactions do not seem to have a great impact in deter-
mining the tendency toward decentralized, nonhierarchical patterns of
alliances.
As for measures of connectedness and average path length, the random
rewiring of transactions and social bonds has partially different effects in
the two cities, because differences induced by random rewiring depend
on the original characteristics of the graph. Consistent with the fact that
random networks have higher levels of connectivity, random rewiring
reduces the average path length and increases the level of connectedness,
with two exceptions: random rewiring does not increase any further the
level of connectedness in Bristol because the original value is already close
to the maximum, and it does not reduce by a great amount the average
path length in Glasgow because such a measure there is already minimal.
In general, results only partially support the hypothesis that transactions
are deployed at random. In fact, random rewiring of transactions is less
conducive to change than social bonds only (and by very small numbers)
with respect to the measure of average path length. In light of this and
previous analyses, we conclude that transactions foster high levels of
connectivity, even though their distribution is not completely random.
Fig. 5.—Graph measures and random rewiring of transactions and social bonds. For
each of the four structural measures of interest (hierarchy, connectedness, average path
length, and clustering), the plot compares values for observed networks (dots), random
rewiring of transactions (squares), and random rewiring of social bonds (triangles) to the
distribution of values obtained from 1,000 simulated random graphs with preserved degree
distribution (box plots). Whiskers extend to the most extreme datapoint that is no more
than 1.5 times the interquartile range from the box. Glasgow and Bristol.
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More likely, transactions are deployed according to “quasi-random” cri-
teria, with weak constraints on partner selectivity.
In sum, the peculiar interplay of social bonds and transactions at the
level of small-scale interactions is responsible for the simultaneity of clus-
tering and connectivity in civic networks, with social bonds largely ac-
counting for clustering and decentralization, and transactions contributing
to the overall integration of the networks. Altogether, this finding under-
lines the role of different kinds of links in the production of micro- and
macrointegration. Specifically, we demonstrate that social bonds char-
acterize collaborative patterns within niches of intense interaction, an
exclusive, inward-looking form of collaboration likely to strengthen in-
terorganizational bonds, while transactions disproportionately differen-
tiate those collaborative ties that span across otherwise disconnected clus-
ters of organizations and therefore foster civil society macrointegration.
Solidarity, Recognition, and In-group Selection
In our framework, social bonds and transactions serve different goals:
one is about identity building, reinforcement, and construction of soli-
darity, the other about the setting up of alliances that are not binding in
the longer term (or at least need not be) in order to achieve short-term
results. Here we show that organizations deploy transactions and social
bonds consistently: first, we test the hypothesis that organizations that
are connected through social bonds are also likely to be bounded by
feelings of solidarity and mutual recognition; second, that organizations
are involved in deeper, longer-term relations with actors mobilized on
their same issues, while at the same time being open to building ad hoc,
short-term alliances with a broader range of civic organizations not so
closely involved with their main agenda. While the former ties strengthen
the sense of commitment and solidarity, the latter exploit contacts with
a broader environment, maximizing the spot mobilized around specific
issues.
According to the first hypothesis, social bonds are more likely to involve
symmetric ties and solidarity. We therefore regress distinct matrices re-
porting symmetric ties and feelings of solidarity on transactions and social
bonds (table 5).21 As expected, social bonds are more powerful predictors
of the presence of symmetric ties and feelings of solidarity between or-
ganizations, which confirms our understanding of social bonds as orga-
21 When respondents identified another organization as a major partner, they were also
asked if they felt broad solidarity feelings toward that organization. That need not
necessarily be the case, as alliances may be driven by purely instrumental motives.
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TABLE 5
Regressions of Reciprocity/Solidarity on Transactions and Social Bonds
Model 1 Model 2
Symmetric Ties (SCs) R2 Solidarity Ties (SCs) R2
Glasgow:
Transactions . . . . . . .340 .306 .213 .466
Social bonds . . . . . . .439 .651
Bristol:
Transactions . . . . . . .248 .277 .190 .525
Social bonds . . . . . . .470 .703
Note.—Distinct matrices of symmetric and solidarity ties were regressed on transactions and social
bonds (QAP, 2,000 permutations). The table reports coefficients and model fit of two models for each
city: the matrix of symmetric ties is the dependent variable in model 1, while the matrix of solidarity
ties is the dependent variable in model 2. Glasgow and Bristol. SCpstandard coefficients.
nizational relationships that go beyond the limits of the specific actions
on which organizations happen to collaborate.
In order to test the second hypothesis, we used the same index previ-
ously computed for comparing the distribution of ties within and between
clusters, but this time, instead of looking at clusters, we considered the
distribution of ties between sets of organizations, which differed according
to their main issue—environment, ethnic minorities, community, and so-
cial exclusion. Tables 6 and 7 report the results for this test. Social bonds
prevail in shaping relations among organizations pursuing the same sub-
stantive interests; in contrast, transactions characterize exchanges between
organizations whose primary, broad agendas are different.
In sum, from the analysis, we observe that transactions and social bonds
distribute differently not only within and across areas of dense interaction,
but also within and across sets of organizations defined by specific issue
interests. One can reasonably ask whether clusters partition and issue
classification closely resemble each other or not. In principle, clusters of
dense interaction might consist of organizations focusing on the same
issue. Empirically, this is not the case. As figures 2 and 3 clearly show,
clusters of dense interaction usually include organizations with different
issue priorities. Exceptions are three small clusters, consisting respectively
of two, three, and five organizations all focusing on environmental issues.
Apart from that, however, organizations focusing on at least two different
issues may be found in each cluster. In some clusters, some issues prevail;
in others there is a complete balance between them.
That there is no general overlap between density of interaction and
organizations’ main issues makes the strategic deployment of transactions
and social bonds even more interesting. Organizations seem to follow a
twofold pattern of interaction, developing stronger relations with civic
TABLE 6
Distribution of Transactions and Social Bonds within and between Issue Types in Bristol
Social Bonds Transactions
Social Bonds/
Transactions Index
Issue No. Within Between All Wthin Between All Within Between All Within Between
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 84 31 115 50 27 77 1.68 1.15 1.49 1.12 1.02
Ethnic minorities . . . . . . . 26 32 22 54 26 34 60 1.23 .65 .90 1.37 .47
Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 20 26 46 32 38 70 .63 .68 .66 .95 .72
Social exclusion . . . . . . . . . 38 20 43 63 2 43 45 10.00 1.00 1.40 7.14 .14
TABLE 7
Distribution of Transactions and Social Bonds within and between Issue Types in Glasgow
Social Bonds Transactions
Social Bonds/
Transactions Index
Issue No. Within Between All Within Between All Within Between All Within Between
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 20 7 27 36 56 92 .56 .13 .29 1.89 .07
Ethnic minorities . . . . . . . 35 18 11 29 76 84 160 .24 .13 .18 1.31 .10
Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 12 8 20 24 65 89 .50 .12 .22 2.23 .06
Social exclusion . . . . . . . . . 41 24 18 42 76 128 204 .32 .14 .21 1.53 .09
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organizations that have their same interests, and instrumental, ad hoc
alliances with organizations that are only marginally committed to their
main goal. In doing so, they generate a web of interactions that is dense
enough to provide them with mutual support, but at the same time open
enough to maintain a certain level of overall connectivity and issue
heterogeneity.
CONCLUSION
This article contributes to the analysis of political networks by paying
simultaneous attention to both the formal properties and the content of
network ties. This approach identifies structural patterns that are re-
markably similar in as diverse locations as Glasgow and Bristol. In both
cities:
1. A polycentric, horizontally integrated structure prevails over a hi-
erarchical, centralized one. Civic networks are found to consist of
internally dense clusters, connected to each other by a smaller num-
ber of bridging ties.
2. The content of ties shapes the overall network structure in significant
ways: strong identity ties (“social bonds”) embed associations into
dense clusters of interaction, while more instrumental, ad hoc alli-
ances (“transactions”) operate across clusters, integrating them into
broader civic networks.
This particular distribution of instrumental, “weak” transactions and
identity-based, “strong” social bonds actually provides the basis for both
micro- and macrointegration within civil society: in fact, it generates net-
works tight enough to embed civic associations in a distinctive environ-
ment, but open enough to connect them to a broader and more hetero-
geneous range of civic organizations. In both localities, stronger social
bonds are more likely to be found between associations sharing the same
broad agenda, while more instrumental transactions tend to prevail be-
tween associations with different agendas.
What we found on the formal properties of civic networks is consistent
with earlier insights from both social movements and community studies.
First, the model of polycentric coordination that emerges from our study
of civic networks closely resembles Gerlach’s (Gerlach and Hine 1970;
Gerlach 2001) classic view of social movements as segmentary, polycentric,
and integrated structures of political action. In his seminal explorations,
Gerlach drew mostly on countercultural or subcultural movements, such
as the Black Power or revivalist Christian movements, and pointed at
the positive consequences deriving for those movements from such net-
work structures (e.g., their increased capacity to withstand repression). In
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a functional vein, he concluded that a structure based on dense clusters
connected by sparse bridging relations best served collective actors’ need
to reduce the costs of repression. In contrast, here we looked at far more
heterogeneous organizations. Most of them do not perceive themselves as
“social movement organizations” or display some of the latter’s most dis-
tinctive features, nor do they feel exposed to high risks of repression. If
the same network structure may be found in organizational populations
that are so diverse in their level of political or cultural radicalism, then
such structural configuration might be characteristic of much broader and
differentiated populations of political actors and reflect more generally
applicable organizational logics.
The model of civic coordination we observed also supports the plu-
ralistic view of power structures, according to which local politics is dom-
inated by a shifting plurality of major political actors rather than a co-
hesive, densely connected elite (Dahl 1961; Knoke 1990). As Laumann
and Pappi (1973, p. 227) showed, “the fault lines of the oppositional struc-
tures and the personnel active on each of the issues do change from one
functional issue to another.” However, while earlier work on local political
networks focused mainly on elite structures (no matter how internally
differentiated), we reach similar conclusions from the perspective of grass-
roots participation. That sustained patterns of collaboration among civil
society organizations cut across interest lines, thus creating the precon-
ditions for shifting alliances and simultaneously contributing to the overall
integration of civil society, is one more illustration of the paradoxical idea
that “crosscutting lines of differentiation foster processes of social inte-
gration, and they also foster processes of recurrent change” (Blau 1974,
p. 615).
Taken together, our main findings both support and enrich recent calls
for the development of broad analytical schemes for the analysis of civic
and political action, encompassing both protest and institutional politics,
as well as elite-driven and populist attempts to shape the political process
(e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Sampson et al. 2005). Our struc-
tural approach to civil society also raises important questions for two
related yet distinctive lines of research: one, focusing on the relationship
between social capital and social integration; the other, on the role of
political contexts (or “opportunity structures”) as determinants of the in-
tensity and form of collective action.
With their clustering and connectivity properties, polycentric forms of
civic coordination can enhance the social capital of civic organizations.
In fact, according to a structural approach to social capital, closure and
brokerage are the complementary properties that “together define social
capital,” here understood as a way of facilitating coordinated action and
creating “for individuals and groups an advantage in pursuing their ends”
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(Burt 2005, p. 7). In general terms, while brokerage improves vision
through the circulation of information and new ideas and mediates be-
tween alternative positions, network closure results, among other things,
in the strengthening of social relations and the enforcement of group
norms.
Closure and brokerage are complementary to each other in the pro-
duction of social capital. In our study, we show this to occur when as-
sociations, in their ordinary activity, engage in multiplex relational pat-
terns, balancing between transactions and social bonds. Substantive
deviations from this model might undermine social integration and even-
tually lead toward different forms of social fragmentation. If social bonds
were dominant, their propensity to generate triadic patterns of interaction
would lead to the fragmentation of civic networks into disconnected,
internally cohesive clusters (fig. 6, left). Group identities would become
exclusive, and civil society would split into conflicting, noncommunicating
camps. If, in contrast, civic networks were only based on ad hoc alliances
and instrumental transactions, then civil society would most likely consist
of quasi-random, contingent patterns of relations. These would hardly be
conducive to the emergence of the longer-term solidarities and deeper
social bonds usually associated with social integration (fig. 6, right).
The implications of the second scenario—the one assuming a total prev-
alence of instrumental transactions—have repeatedly been highlighted by
analysts of civil society on both sides of the Atlantic. The decline in
individual involvement in associations and the progressive professional-
ism of the civic sector might indeed undermine civic associations’ capacity
to develop and maintain social bonds based on personal ties. A substantive
reduction of identity relationships might lead to an undifferentiated as-
sociational model in which associations interact on the basis of ad hoc,
instrumental relations that do not promote broader identities and hori-
zontal solidarity.
For example, in the United Kingdom, many have denounced the risks
attached to the growing professionalism and reduction in the active cit-
izenry, the most prominent being the diminished capacity of civil society
to develop horizontal, grassroots forms of cooperation and the crisis of
social capital in civil society (Knight and Stokes 1996; Lowndes et al.
2001; Taylor 2003). Along similar lines, many have documented the in-
creasing level of professionalism and specialization of voluntary associ-
ations in the United States, at the same time voicing the fear that asso-
ciational differentiation may result in the deepening of social and economic
divisions in American society (Wuthnow 1998; Skocpol 2003). Previous
research has conclusively shown how important alliance building is as a
tool to overcome the shortage of resources and influence experienced by
many civic organizations—especially those acting on behalf of the most
American Journal of Sociology
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Fig. 6.—Extreme cases in a polycentric model of coordination
deprived constituencies (Knoke 1990). If rates of associational involve-
ment—and in particular, obviously, of multiple memberships—were to
fall dramatically, then the opportunities for alliance building created by
this type of connections would drop accordingly. The greater coordination
efforts required by the building of ad hoc coalitions on each single issue
would be most easily sustainable by the best-endowed organizations, and
this would end up deepening inequalities of access to the polity.
Let us now look at the other extreme scenario, entailing the prevalence
of social bonds within civic networks—and hence the rise in rates of
associational involvement and multiple memberships. Here, the impli-
cations of this trend are perhaps less obvious. Scholars usually assume
that high levels of individual participation and associational density are
good for democracy and conversely see the decline of individual mem-
berships as a threat to social integration (for a review of the debate, see
Fung [2003]). However, this need not be necessarily the case.
According to our analysis, the interorganizational links created by mul-
tiple memberships tend, consistent with balance theory, to cluster within
tightly connected groups. Civic networks with a large proportion of social
bonds are therefore at risk of social fragmentation and factionalism, an
aspect that casts doubts on the generally optimistic view of individual
participation in associations. The consequence of an increasing involve-
ment of citizens in associations might not necessarily be the overall in-
tegration of society but its deeper fragmentation in distinct, noncom-
municating clusters. This point has obviously been made many times
before, whether in reference to the demise of democracy in Weimar Ger-
many (Allen 1984) or to the various instances (mafia families, Northern
Civic Networks
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Ireland religious communities, or the KKK) in which “bonding social
capital” is clearly detrimental to civic integration.
What our analysis—somehow worryingly—suggests is that the negative
effects of dense associational memberships might not be restricted to the
usual suspects: indeed, it is the growth beyond a certain level that threat-
ens the integration of civil society, regardless of whether the activities that
generate it be intrinsically “good” or “bad” for democracy. The integration
of civil society seems rather to rest on the precarious balance of the two
different logics of action we have identified. This runs counter to overly
optimistic views of participatory, populist democracy, particularly popular
among social movement analysts (Baiocchi 2001; Medearis 2005; della
Porta and Diani 2006, pp. 239–45). It might also prompt a critical reas-
sessment of theories of democracy emphasizing the risk of “political over-
loading” for contemporary democracies (Crozier, Huntington, and Wa-
tanuki 1975; Hagopian 2000).
An area in which our analysis does not reach firm conclusions yet poses
provoking questions concerns the relationship between the network forms
of collective action and their political and institutional setting. Over the
last decades, the political process approach has placed contextual and
institutional variables at the core of scholarly accounts of the intensity
and forms of political participation at both the individual and the group
level (for a recent summary, see Kriesi [2004]). However, the relationship
between political opportunities and the structure of interorganizational
networks has received only scant attention (among the few exceptions are
Rucht [1989], Diani [2003], Osa [2003]). Here, we expected political op-
portunities to affect crucial network features in at least two ways. On the
one hand, we thought that the increasing professionalization of the vol-
untary and community sector and its growing involvement in policy mak-
ing at the local level, both UK-wide trends encouraged by New Labour
policies (Daly 2006), would have led to hierarchical, centralized networks
in both cities. As civic organizations depended less on broad-based, grass-
roots campaigning and felt encouraged to secure their own niche through
higher division of labor, this might have resulted in their working largely
on their own while developing a few instrumental ties to a small number
of central, highly influential actors within the sector. As it were, both
Bristol and Glasgow turned out to display nonhierarchical, polycentric
structures.
On the other hand, we expected the deep differences between the two
cities regarding the salience of traditional political cleavages, most notably
the class one, to reflect in network structures too. When ideological dif-
ferences are strong, fragmentation of civil society into distinct, noncom-
municating, internally dense clusters is in order (Linz 1967; Sawer and
Grove 1994). In contrast, when the salience of existing cleavages is low,
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centralized structures, connected through a small number of core orga-
nizations, seem more likely (Lowe and Goyder 1983; Diani 2003). In our
specific cases, the lesser salience of classic social and political cleavages
in Bristol would lead us to expect civic networks to be more centralized
and more hierarchical there than in Glasgow: once again, though, our
expectations were confounded, as the two cities showed remarkably sim-
ilar structures.
Despite the substantive differences between Glasgow and Bristol in
both their socioeconomic profile and their political tradition, civic net-
works actually display the same structural properties in both cities, sug-
gesting that fundamental relational mechanisms are consistent across dif-
ferent social and political contexts. Of course, this might be due to the
fact that Bristol and Glasgow are actually more similar than one would
stipulate if one adopted a too close, local perspective. For all their dif-
ferences, they are both located in the same democratic system, involved
in the same national political, cultural, and media arenas.
And yet, while we are far from considering the polycentric model of
coordination a universal feature of civic networks, we nonetheless think
that the scope conditions of our findings go beyond the two cities here
investigated. Our analysis is not limited to the description of similar net-
work structures, but shows that in both cities the same microrelational
mechanisms and organizational logics are at work in bringing about cer-
tain macroproperties. This suggests that organizational patterns of inter-
action might be largely independent of local conditions and mostly driven
by the intrinsic properties of the relations in which actors are embedded.
At least this is what we observed. It may not be the case everywhere,
and comparisons of civic networks in different democratic systems, or
also including semiauthoritarian regimes, might yield different results. But
it is definitely a finding worth further investigation.
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